Review: Democracy or Bonapartism by Domenico Losurdo

This is an incredibly relevant work for understanding modern day democracy and its discontents. Losurdo traces history from the French Revolution through the 1992 US Presidential election to show the development of Bonapartism. We see how soft Bonapartism of the US and other countries of the West (versus the war Bonpartism of fascism) is remarkably stable, and yet fails to deliver on the emancipation and social welfare one might expect would come of universal suffrage.

Bonapartism is a political structure characterized by a powerful and charismatic executive, who legitimizes their power through the support of the masses, and who becomes the interpreter of the nation — that is, power is personalized. To pave over internal strife between economic classes within a nation, conflict is externalized, and the Bonapartist leader is imbued with a mandate to protect (and expand) the lofty ideals of the nation. Soft Bonapartism is able to shift from states of exception to states of normality, and part of its stability comes from its ability to change out heads of state when the current Bonapartist leader no longer can point to popular support. This is accomplished by having competitive elections between multiple factions of a single party.

Along with the increasing power of the Bonapartist leader comes a reduction of the power of political parties, if not through overt legal means, via the implementation of single-member districts over proportional representation. We also see increased monopoly over theoretical production, i.e., the consolidation of mass media under the control over a few billionaires. Though soft Bonapartism comes with universal suffrage (first for just white men, and now for nearly all adults), we also see a disemancipation in our ability to participate in political decision-making and debate.

Readers may be particularly curious about Losurdo’s assessment of the socialist states of the twentieth century. Losurdo argues that none of these leaders were Bonapartist figures (though Mao at one point came closest), in part due to the role political parties play in mediating power. Because political parties act as forums for political education and debate, they maintain the political engagement of the masses and act as insulation against the personalization of power.

Losurdo notes that we are currently in a wave of disemancipation, and that the end is not yet in sight. He has few answers for the steps going forward, although reading between the lines it seems like fighting for proportional representation and re-taking control over the means of information dissemination (education, news, etc) are likely bets. I’d recommend this book as a good introduction to Marxist critique of modern political structures, and as a first book by this author.

Review: Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy by Joseph Stiglitz

This book works as a corrective for people who think that government policy has little impact on wealth equality, but who also care about wealth inequality as morally bad. I'm not sure exactly what audience that is. Some elected democrats, I suppose, and some of their more dedicated but privileged voters. And that is, of course, who this book is addressed to. (Stiglitz wrote this report in 2016, presumably imagining a Clinton administration. In 2024, his discussion of recession recovery, inflation rates, etc, seems already somewhat dated.)

There are many entirely reasonable policies presented here. Capital gains rates should indeed be taxed at a higher rate. Worker bargaining needs to be strengthened. Patent laws are stifling innovation and hurting the general public, who cannot afford life-saving medications, or who have to pay exorbitant costs for it due to laws that block the public sector bargaining for a discount. Addressing these issues would indeed lead to a better economy for the majority of Americans. Though (perhaps because of this work and works like it) there is nothing particularly novel about these recommendations nor the way in which they are advocated.

There is very little role for the State to play in Stiglitz's path forward, other than simply tweaking the rules here or there. I, for example, would argue that if a business is too big to fail, it should be a state owned enterprise, while Stiglitz thinks such banks merely need to have better wills, and maybe be held to a higher level of scrutiny. I also think there should be a public retirement savings plan and many other such public programs, subsidized and well-governed, while Stiglitz believes the main responsibility of a public program is to encourage better market competition and that they should not be subsidized or otherwise given "unfair" advantages.

The analysis is overall flawed for three reasons, one economic, one political, and one philosophical. First, Stiglitz believes that "The American economy is not out of balance because of the natural laws of economics. Today's inequality is not the result of the inevitable evolution of capitalism." This is stated without further justification, as an axiom on which the rest of the book rests. Capitalism necessitates inequality, and sharpens inequality. If everyone has equal wealth and opportunity, there would be no workers for capitalists to hire, or no capitalists for workers to sell their labour to. Because owning capital means you can make money by having money, and without working, inequality naturally rises. Stiglitz takes aim primarily at the financial sector for not doing its job of providing liquidity for investing in production. This is, of course, not the job of the financial sector. The financial sector, like the manufacturing sector and every other private sector, has as its task the goal of accumulating capital. That is what it means to live under capitalism. The finance sector has done a fantastic job of accumulating capital. Stiglitz's proposals, such as implementing a tax on all financial trades, are no more than a game of whack-a-mole of trying to curb the less useful innovations in accumulation of capital.

Second, Stiglitz appears to be uninterested in how policy changes. There is, of course, a hand-waving towards how the government is primarily composed of the wealth, and how the private sector has captured the bodies that regulate them. These issues are to be solved with, for example, easier voter registration and holidays on election days (which are, I agree, policies worth fighting for!). But why would people with political power fight to disprivilege themselves? There is little evidence presented that they would, and Stiglitz seems convinced that simply reasoning with his audience and presenting them a few statistics would be enough for them to willingly sign over a few extra million dollars of their own wealth each year.

Finally, Stiglitz's analysis is ahistorical. In his telling, past efforts were all simply misguided policy decisions. "We now know" that "[supply-side economics] is incorrect and outdated", that "developed economies can rise without lifting all boats," that by "giving into such threats" that businesses would move elsewhere if we did not deregulate we "lost doubly" by hurting the economy and worsening income inequality, and that "the arguments put forward by advocates for capital tax breaks--that they spur investment--is wrong." But these were known before. Each of these policy changes were sharply criticized and opposed at the time. These critics have been proven correct, to little fanfare or reward. But Stiglitz seems uninterested in pursuing why we made these erroneous policy changes. And without asking that question (is it because of who had political power? is it due to fundamental assumptions about economics that must be revised, such as whether capitalism inherently breeds inequality?) how do we know we are not making incorrect policy decisions once more?

Review: Women, the State and Revolution by Wendy Goldman

This book serves well as a reference, but for a full picture of women’s issues in the USSR, there is a considerable amount of context missing. 

Goldman’s introductory chapter provides a brief but excellent history of feminist and socialist thought up through 1917. Though initial conceptions of the role of the family in a socialist state were radical, with this intellectual history, the Bolshevik 1918 family code and the discourse around it are shown to be well-reasoned and strongly grounded in the progressive philosophy of the time. What would have made this chapter indispensable would be a comparison with family code legislation in other countries (recall that French women only got the right to vote in 1944, French illegitimate children only became equal to legitimate children in 2002, and at-will abortions are still illegal in England and massively restricted in many countries in the West). The innovation in the 1918 Soviet family code was not really brought home in the way it should have been. How did feminist achievements in the first socialist state impact the movement elsewhere? 

Alas, answering these questions would have been a very different book, and Goldman keeps the readers eyes focused tightly on the interior of the country, with little comparison to the legal treatment of women and children in other countries. (How did other countries handle the surplus of orphans following a war? How did other industrializing nations handle unemployment of women and lack of birth control technology?). We also see little in terms of foreign relations (largely hostile) or economic challenges that provide context towards the country’s challenges in feeding and clothing its people; to what other ends did the country direct its resources, and were its investments successful?

Most of the subsequent chapters provide detailed statistics and touching first person accounts about the difficulties experienced by orphans and women during the aftermath of the first world war and the civil war. The author editorializes somewhat, with each instance of suffering being terrible, but every attempt to fix it being somehow worse. Was there anything the author believes should and could have been done differently, with the wisdom of hindsight? These chapters were informative, but not particularly insightful.

Chapters 5 and 6, however, were more illuminating. In these chapters, Goldman skillfully maps out the fiery and varied debate about the 1926 code. The challenge of finding a robust set of rules that would serve both the urban proletariat and the peasantry — a way of life already diminishing by 1917 — and protect women and children and advance feminist conceptions of love and gender was an unsolvable puzzle. 

Perhaps particularly because of how brilliantly Goldman untangles this discourse, the subsequent rollbacks in family law in the 1930s appear to come a little out of nowhere. Was it truly so difficult to find writing regarding the thought process over the criminalization of abortion and the increased emphasis on the family as an institution for promoting economic security? The last two chapters felt a bit lazy; the conclusion was presupposed that these regressions in social policy were all “political” ploys by the Stalinist regime, and it was not necessary to dive deep into archives to understand why. Wendy writes, "The ideological reversal of the 1930s was essentially political, not economic or material in nature, bearing all the marks of Stalinist policy in other areas." A “political” decision to what “political” end? Unclear.

I picked up this book in part to answer the question of why the first nation to legalize abortion rolled it back not two decades later. I have my answer: initial legalization of abortion was viewed as a remedy to the problem of vast child poverty that the state was unable to support, and somewhat secondarily as a way to alleviate health issues arising from illegal abortions. It was not primarily an issue of the right of a woman to bodily autonomy. Conversely, when abortion law became once again more restrictive, it was viewed as a remedy to declining birth rates (discussion of the impacts of illegal abortion appears to have been minimal), and sold as something no longer necessary due to increasing economic resources for women. In the West, we view abortion so firmly within the language of bodily autonomy and right to choose that to take away this right is seen as a despicable encroachment on human rights. The USSR’s changing attitudes towards abortion do make more sense when viewed as a method of addressing social issues. Though, of course, I think they were wrong to take away this right.

This is a tragic story. The Bolsheviks correctly saw marriage as a tool of patriarchal oppression of women, and wished to bring about its withering away. Now, a century later, it has, in many ways, withered. Better birth control methods give women the confidence to enjoy sexual relationships outside of marriage, better educational and work opportunities give more women the independence to support themselves without a partner, and the laws of many countries have caught up to this material reality by providing legal protections to “de facto” marriages, much like the Bolshevik feminists fought for.

Review: How China Escaped The Poverty Trap by Yuen Yuen Ang

This is a well-structured intervention into a body of scholarly output that seems woefully unable to understand China’s economic rise. Yuen Yuen Ang insists on understanding development as an interconnected, co-evolutionary process, in which governance and economic growth are mutually interdependent, against the prevailing schools of “good governance → growth” (how does one develop ‘good’ institutions without resources?), “growth → good governance” (where does the growth come from?) or “history → good governance → growth” (deterministic, fatalistic, sometimes chauvinistic).

In one line, Ang’s argument is: Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.

“Weak” institutions are those that correspond to Max Weber’s framework for pre-modern institutions as opposed to legal-rational, professional bureaucracies; that is, those that fuse personal and private interests, are regulated partially rather than impartially, implement policies without coordination, and involve fee extractions as opposed to disinterested oversight. As Ang notes, there is a chauvinism in the way this classification is applied:

We miss the obvious because standard binary labels of “weak/strong” and “good/bad” blinds us to the potential of nonmodern, nonformal, non-rule-of-law, and nondemocratic institutions. Our conventional and strongly rooted bias that the norms of the developed West are universally best leads us to regard any deviation from these norms only as weaknesses. Consequently, institutions in developing societies are routinely identified by what they are not rather than by what they are.

She highlights the ways that “weak” institutions are well-suited to the tasks of initial development, including being able to leverage strong communities ties in order to mobilize resources, move quickly and improvise, and adapt to local conditions and needs. Combating a persistent myth that all that is needed for development to explode is for government to protect private property and otherwise get out of the way (as in England’s 1688 Glorious Revolution), Ang looks at how examples of “weak” institutions supported development in 14th-15th century Europe. I particularly liked her insight into the rationality of prebendalism (widespread throughout Europe at this time): central governments unable to pay or administer salaries to a dispersed bureaucracy instead bestow the right to take portions of the taxes in exchange for collecting the taxes.

In treating development as co-evolutionary, Ang leans on the biological metaphor. In evolution, random variation leads to advantages that are selected for, either leading to survival of the fittest, or divergence into specialization to fill a niche. These themes of variation, selection and niche creation are as crucial for studying economic development, but where the origin of species is determined by unambiguous markers of success (survival and reproduction), in sociological systems, what should be considered “success” is determined via public debate and political decision-making (and, though Ang doesn’t say so, the survival of the State).

Ang’s specific advice for developing countries based on her analysis of China’s remarkable development, is (like me, Ang’s a big fan of numbered lists):

1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility. China’s central government developed a system of red policies (clear uncrossable lines enforced consistently by the state), black policies (clear positive instructions from the state that must be fulfilled), and grey policies (deliberately ambiguous guidelines). The “grey” area permitted variation and improvisation, and the central government would then transform successful interventions into “black” universal policies. As Deng Xiaoping says, “Cross the river by feeling for the stones.”
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously. Because all aspects of an economy are interconnected, it is not pragmatic to change only a few policies at once. While China’s reform period is marked by incremental change, incremental does not always mean small, and China’s reforms were often bold and typically multi-pronged. 
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly. At the start of Reform and Opening Up, the central state defined success as economic success. With additional resources at its disposal, additional success metrics have been incorporated, such as environmental policy. (Here, I wish Ang had spent considerably more time, including on interplay between social markers like poverty alleviation or education and economic factors, alas!)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process. Even the on-the-ground representatives of the state, like regulatory officers and school teachers, were given personal incentives in the form of income or professional advancement to work towards the collective goals. (I appreciated Ang’s examination of all levels of the bureaucracy, versus party leaders.)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich. Coastal regions in China had significant trade advantages, and so developed first. As these regions took off, financed largely by foreign direct investment, domestic investment (both state and private) then shifted to the center of the country.
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets. Like parenting a newborn is different from parenting a teen, developing new markets is different from maintaining existing markets. It is not a matter of developing “good enough” institutions, but of using the institutions you have in the best way possible to achieve development

Ang’s examination is very market focused — even more so than I have laid out here. In her exposition, the goal of development is to have strong markets and institutions that support them. My own value system differs somewhat: the goal is to have a thriving, happy, liberated populace and markets are a tool to enable that. Correspondingly, discussion of the human happiness side of China’s meteoric rise was nearly absent from the narrative, and when it was presented, the negative was emphasized: slums, emptied out villages, etc (to her credit, Ang notes that the same patterns emerged during Europe’s early development) rather than poverty alleviation and a continuation of the rise in life expectancy that started with the 1949 revolution. 

There was very little examination at the philosophical factors that led to China’s uniquely being able to solve the poverty trap. In this way, it was the near opposite of When China Rules The World, which I read earlier this year and which explains China’s rise as a result of its Neo-Confucianism more than any material factors. Ang hits the mark a little better, and I think it is not a coincidence that she emphasizes the interconnectedness of systems, the relationship between economic structure and superstructure, and how one stage of development lays the foundations for the stage of development supersedes it. Or, in other words, her analysis is (unintentionally, I think) dialectical and material, the same philosophical foundations of the Communist Party of China. Ang dismisses — or, to the extent they are discussed, regards as one-sidedly tragic — the policies of the Mao era. I think the relationship between pre-Reform and post-Reform China is more continuous than that presented here, and the impact of policies of that era transmitted well beyond the 1970s.

Ang defends her theses by exploring three cities within China that took different paths to development. She used placeholder names (“Forest Hill”) and I would have preferred she use the real names so that I came away from the book with a firm grasp of a real location rather than a firm grasp of somewhere in The Shire. Ang also compares antebellum United States and Nigeria’s Nollywood as examples of development outside China that fulfilled these steps. Showing two positive controls gives the reader confidence in her thesis. As a scientist, I did note the lack of negative controls that would have lent further support to the parsimoniousness of her recommendations: were there locations that implemented five of her six recommendations but saw only tepid growth?

Though I read it critically, I found this to be informative and thought-provoking. The structure of institutions must match the tasks at hand. This is a lesson worth bearing in mind whether the tasks at hand are those of a small local community organization, a venture capital-backed start-up, or the governing body of the world’s most populous country.