Review: How to Read Chinese Poetry, edited by Zong-Qi Cai

This guided anthology is an autodidact’s dream. It provides the breadth and depth of a university-level course in Chinese poetry, assuming little familiarity with Chinese literature, language or history. 

After an introduction to the general content and form of traditional Chinese poetry, each chapter focuses on a particular time period and style of poetry, starting with the Shijing (11th-7th centuries BCE), and ending with the Ming and Qing dynasties (1400s-1912). These chapters present and analyze a selection of representative poems, which are provided in translation, in traditional Chinese script, in pinyin, and in transliterated characters. This format allows appreciation of the emotional content of the poems, their syllabic patterns, the ambiguity in meaning, and the beauty of the organization of the characters. The chapters are written by different contributors, and so the historical and interpretive context provided and the emphasis of the analyses vary between chapters, however I found them to be consistently educational and enriching of my understanding of each era and style. 

The book then concludes with a chapter considering how specific aspects of the Chinese language lend themselves to the poetic devices commonly employed, and how grammatical constructs and thus presentation of ideas varied across the different eras as line length and structure changed. While the book does not assume the reader knows Mandarin, I believe my elementary grasp of the language helped me appreciate this chapter more (and in turn, this chapter helped me appreciate the beauty of the language).

While I found the regulated verse of the Tang dynasty impressive — the constraints in tone and structure produced some gorgeous creativity — I found the lyrical poems of the Song dynasties more often touched my heart. I was also delighted by the simple but timeless works of the ancient Shijing. The chronological order of the chapters also gave me an appreciation for the evolution in style, and the change in the role of elevated speech as society evolves.

I’d recommend this as a work for anyone with a broad interest in Chinese literature, which so often references their poetic tradition, or for anyone who enjoys studying ancient poetry.

Review: How China Escaped Shock Therapy by Isabella Weber

This ended up being perhaps my favourite book of the year. Weber’s argument is clearly organized and based on extensive interviews with dozens of key figures involved in China’s 1970s-1980s reform period. I’ll summarize briefly some of the key conclusions I drew from her research and presentation:

(1) China’s reform should be thought of as indigenous, not “westernization.” In charting a path forward, the CPC and their advisors looked to ancient philosophy and liberation era (1930s-1940s) policy, and rejected the “Washington Consensus” that ended up wreaking havoc on Eastern Europe in the 1990s.

(2) The question was never whether or not to reform, but how to reform. There were clear failures of the existing system to address the new stage of development China had entered. Furthermore, the modern industrial system had become increasingly high tech, and China needed to catch up and keep up with this rapidly changing system.

(3) The two approaches to reform can be grouped into idealist “package reform” and pragmatist “experimental gradualism.” The package reform position, which aligned with the Washington Consensus, was idealist because it formulated an ideal market state, and believed that implementing the required infrastructure would be sufficient to achieve it, all in one step (“shock therapy”). The pragmatist approach, on the other hand, adapted to changing conditions, recognizing the interconnectedness of the economy, and made use of the dual-track price system to raise production in key areas without increasing prices. These two modes of thought (idealist package reformers versus experimental gradualists) had echoes in ancient Chinese debates.

(4) When trying to understand the impacts of price control liberalization, it is important to study not only Socialist Bloc countries; liberal capitalist democracies also resorted to price controls in times of war, and provide valuable case studies for understanding typical economic patterns. For example, post WW2, the USA followed rapid price liberalization and experienced high inflation and unemployment. In contrast, the UK followed slow, incremental reform, and avoided these catastrophes. These same results followed, respectively, in the wake of Eastern Europe’s rapid price liberalization and China’s slow price liberalization.

(5) The CPC’s success in economic reform stems from their careful study of economic policy from multiple schools of thought, as well as interviews with bureaucrats from nations that also conducted economics reforms in the late 20th century (Eastern Europe and Latin America). Surprisingly, economists and those with actual hands-on experience diverged wildly. Economists promoted policies more aligned with the Washington Consensus while those in charge of implementing these policies were far more critical of their successfulness. CPC policy was informed by their analysis of neoliberal, Keynesian, and Marxist economic thought and economic tools.

(6) Despite price liberalization and increased reliance on market forces, the CPC retained control over large parts of the economy. Unlike the CPSU, the CPC did not relinquish political control over banks, allowing them to direct capital flows via market means. State owned enterprises continued to play a large role in the economy. New growth, particularly in non-essentials and consumer products, was privately owned while crucial but slower growing heavy industry and energy sectors remained under state control.

(7) Economic reforms were rolled out gradually, responding to economic conditions and popular sentiment — more poetically summarized as “crossing the river by touching the stones.” The CPC advanced reforms only when they felt they were on solid, stable footing. At times, they rolled back reforms in response to public outcry or rapid inflation.

Economies are complex and dynamic: it can take a long time to change course, yet on the other hand, rapid change can lead to collapse and crisis in just a matter of months. China’s reforms should be considered a remarkable success regardless of one’s preference for free markets or absence thereof. The CPC achieved its goal of economic development without the devastation that swept across other former planned economies. I wished Weber had spent a little more time analyzing measures related to quality of life; economic development is not the whole picture of economic success, and all industrialized countries went through significant poverty and deprivation during their industrialization. Still, quality of life in China seems relatively high, and continues to improve. The world holds its breath to see how China will tackle future reforms: will it liberalize further, or return to more socialized ownership of the means of production? My hope (and hunch…) is for the latter, but regardless of the path they choose, I feel confident it will be charted via thorough study, careful analysis of changing conditions, and long-term thinking.

Review: How China Escaped The Poverty Trap by Yuen Yuen Ang

This is a well-structured intervention into a body of scholarly output that seems woefully unable to understand China’s economic rise. Yuen Yuen Ang insists on understanding development as an interconnected, co-evolutionary process, in which governance and economic growth are mutually interdependent, against the prevailing schools of “good governance → growth” (how does one develop ‘good’ institutions without resources?), “growth → good governance” (where does the growth come from?) or “history → good governance → growth” (deterministic, fatalistic, sometimes chauvinistic).

In one line, Ang’s argument is: Poor and weak countries can escape the poverty trap by first building markets with weak institutions and, more fundamentally, by crafting environments that facilitate improvisation among the relevant players.

“Weak” institutions are those that correspond to Max Weber’s framework for pre-modern institutions as opposed to legal-rational, professional bureaucracies; that is, those that fuse personal and private interests, are regulated partially rather than impartially, implement policies without coordination, and involve fee extractions as opposed to disinterested oversight. As Ang notes, there is a chauvinism in the way this classification is applied:

We miss the obvious because standard binary labels of “weak/strong” and “good/bad” blinds us to the potential of nonmodern, nonformal, non-rule-of-law, and nondemocratic institutions. Our conventional and strongly rooted bias that the norms of the developed West are universally best leads us to regard any deviation from these norms only as weaknesses. Consequently, institutions in developing societies are routinely identified by what they are not rather than by what they are.

She highlights the ways that “weak” institutions are well-suited to the tasks of initial development, including being able to leverage strong communities ties in order to mobilize resources, move quickly and improvise, and adapt to local conditions and needs. Combating a persistent myth that all that is needed for development to explode is for government to protect private property and otherwise get out of the way (as in England’s 1688 Glorious Revolution), Ang looks at how examples of “weak” institutions supported development in 14th-15th century Europe. I particularly liked her insight into the rationality of prebendalism (widespread throughout Europe at this time): central governments unable to pay or administer salaries to a dispersed bureaucracy instead bestow the right to take portions of the taxes in exchange for collecting the taxes.

In treating development as co-evolutionary, Ang leans on the biological metaphor. In evolution, random variation leads to advantages that are selected for, either leading to survival of the fittest, or divergence into specialization to fill a niche. These themes of variation, selection and niche creation are as crucial for studying economic development, but where the origin of species is determined by unambiguous markers of success (survival and reproduction), in sociological systems, what should be considered “success” is determined via public debate and political decision-making (and, though Ang doesn’t say so, the survival of the State).

Ang’s specific advice for developing countries based on her analysis of China’s remarkable development, is (like me, Ang’s a big fan of numbered lists):

1. Delimit boundaries of experimentation and flexibility. China’s central government developed a system of red policies (clear uncrossable lines enforced consistently by the state), black policies (clear positive instructions from the state that must be fulfilled), and grey policies (deliberately ambiguous guidelines). The “grey” area permitted variation and improvisation, and the central government would then transform successful interventions into “black” universal policies. As Deng Xiaoping says, “Cross the river by feeling for the stones.”
2. Activate incremental changes across connected domains simultaneously. Because all aspects of an economy are interconnected, it is not pragmatic to change only a few policies at once. While China’s reform period is marked by incremental change, incremental does not always mean small, and China’s reforms were often bold and typically multi-pronged. 
3. In the beginning, define success narrowly. At the start of Reform and Opening Up, the central state defined success as economic success. With additional resources at its disposal, additional success metrics have been incorporated, such as environmental policy. (Here, I wish Ang had spent considerably more time, including on interplay between social markers like poverty alleviation or education and economic factors, alas!)
4. Give everyone a personal stake in the development process. Even the on-the-ground representatives of the state, like regulatory officers and school teachers, were given personal incentives in the form of income or professional advancement to work towards the collective goals. (I appreciated Ang’s examination of all levels of the bureaucracy, versus party leaders.)
5. Let some get rich first but pair up the poor and the rich. Coastal regions in China had significant trade advantages, and so developed first. As these regions took off, financed largely by foreign direct investment, domestic investment (both state and private) then shifted to the center of the country.
6. Harness weak institutions to build markets. Like parenting a newborn is different from parenting a teen, developing new markets is different from maintaining existing markets. It is not a matter of developing “good enough” institutions, but of using the institutions you have in the best way possible to achieve development

Ang’s examination is very market focused — even more so than I have laid out here. In her exposition, the goal of development is to have strong markets and institutions that support them. My own value system differs somewhat: the goal is to have a thriving, happy, liberated populace and markets are a tool to enable that. Correspondingly, discussion of the human happiness side of China’s meteoric rise was nearly absent from the narrative, and when it was presented, the negative was emphasized: slums, emptied out villages, etc (to her credit, Ang notes that the same patterns emerged during Europe’s early development) rather than poverty alleviation and a continuation of the rise in life expectancy that started with the 1949 revolution. 

There was very little examination at the philosophical factors that led to China’s uniquely being able to solve the poverty trap. In this way, it was the near opposite of When China Rules The World, which I read earlier this year and which explains China’s rise as a result of its Neo-Confucianism more than any material factors. Ang hits the mark a little better, and I think it is not a coincidence that she emphasizes the interconnectedness of systems, the relationship between economic structure and superstructure, and how one stage of development lays the foundations for the stage of development supersedes it. Or, in other words, her analysis is (unintentionally, I think) dialectical and material, the same philosophical foundations of the Communist Party of China. Ang dismisses — or, to the extent they are discussed, regards as one-sidedly tragic — the policies of the Mao era. I think the relationship between pre-Reform and post-Reform China is more continuous than that presented here, and the impact of policies of that era transmitted well beyond the 1970s.

Ang defends her theses by exploring three cities within China that took different paths to development. She used placeholder names (“Forest Hill”) and I would have preferred she use the real names so that I came away from the book with a firm grasp of a real location rather than a firm grasp of somewhere in The Shire. Ang also compares antebellum United States and Nigeria’s Nollywood as examples of development outside China that fulfilled these steps. Showing two positive controls gives the reader confidence in her thesis. As a scientist, I did note the lack of negative controls that would have lent further support to the parsimoniousness of her recommendations: were there locations that implemented five of her six recommendations but saw only tepid growth?

Though I read it critically, I found this to be informative and thought-provoking. The structure of institutions must match the tasks at hand. This is a lesson worth bearing in mind whether the tasks at hand are those of a small local community organization, a venture capital-backed start-up, or the governing body of the world’s most populous country.

Review: When China Rules the World by Martin Jacques

The Western punditry can’t make much sense of China. It has elections, but they don’t look anything like the Presidential horse race the US hosts every four years. It has capitalists and markets, but these too don’t look like the western equivalents: there are state owned entities and communist party cells and capital flow restrictions everywhere. It has adopted industrialization, international trade and the internet, but these institutions of modernity did not bring with them the value system that the West recognizes as modernity. What gives? This book is a corrective to the prevailing level of discourse. 

The strengths of Jacques’ book is its recognition that “modernity” (values, and the political structures that reflect them) can take multiple forms, and that a non-Western version of modernity becoming the (economically, demographically) dominant form is not necessarily a travesty. The first few chapters of the book stand out in particular: Jacques examines the history of China and Japan, with the latter providing a comparison point of an industrialized country that has tried to align itself more closely with “Western” conceptions of modernity despite lacking European roots. Jacques emphasizes the influence of Confucianism on popular understandings of the relationship between the State and the governed, and the continuity in philosophy between pre-1949 China through to the present day — another strength of the book. 

However, Jacques ignores the impact of Marxism-Leninism in shaping not just Mao-era China but also present-day China. Marxist figures and quotes are frequent reference points in public speeches. But perhaps more indicative of the influence of Marxism-Leninism is programs like the extreme poverty eradication program, in which communist party members act as guides to local political efforts:

The targeted phase of poverty alleviation required building relationships and trust between the Party and the people in the countryside as well as strengthening Party organisation at the grassroots level. Party secretaries are assigned to oversee the task of poverty alleviation across five levels of government, from the province, city, county, and township, down to the village. Most notably, three million carefully selected cadres were dispatched to poor villages, forming 255,000 teams that reside there. Living in humble conditions for generally one to three years at a time, the teams worked alongside poor peasants, local officials, and volunteers until each household was lifted out of poverty.

This is a method of poverty alleviation alien to neoliberalism, similarly strange to welfare states and not particularly Confucian, and yet remarkably effective: in 2021, China announced it had eliminated extreme poverty. Because Jacques’ picture of the guiding principles of 21st century China is essentially neo-Confucianism, I think his model for China’s growth and future decision-making as world power is incomplete.

In place of really understanding the philosophical traditions guiding the countries—both those of the West and those of China—Jacques turns to psychologizing the countries. Even economic factors, like level of development, fade to the background. The root of trade disagreements is found in hundreds of millions of people acting in unison out of shame or pride based on their sense of national identity. It’s not to say that these factors are not important; China’s resolution to gain independence following its “century of humiliation” and the role the Declaration of Independence plays in the US’s self perception as a fighter for freedom are undoubtedly relevant. But one can’t help but feel there’s several variables missing. 

Finally, while Jacques tactic of using a sort of “neutral, outside observer” lens for understanding China and Japan is instructive, that he does not do the same for the United States limits his analysis. (I’m a scientist, I like controlled experiments.) What, for example, would a “neutral, outside observer” say about racism in 21st century USA?

Overall, although Jacques’ book is a corrective to a far worse sort of analysis, it leaves much to be desired. Written originally in 2009 (it is peppered with references to the ‘08 recession), it reads a bit dated, and China/West relations have changed a lot.